

1. Il concetto di natura in Sartre, *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica*, 67\1 (1975), pp. 43-59.

The purpose is to verify how criticism of social sciences taken up in Sartre's *Critique of dialectical reason* is conditioned by the author's unquestioned assumptions concerning the concept of nature. Although Sartre looked at Husserl's *Crisis of the European Sciences* as a model for his own criticism of social sciences, he did not consider the criticism of the concept of nature undertaken by Husserl, which at least tries to find a way out of Cartesian dualism. What Sartre eventually does is instead superposing phenomenological ways of thinking to a Cartesian ontology which he never challenged. This is why he looks upon Subject and Object, and Spirit and Matter as radically opposites. Thus, his vindication of methodological dualism depends upon presupposed ontological dualism.

2. Il concetto di eros in 'Le deuxième sexe' di Simone de Beauvoir, in V. Melchiorre (ed.), *Amore e matrimonio nel pensiero filosofico e teologico moderno*, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1976, pp. 296-318.

The paper discusses how a Cartesian dualism, inherited from Sartre, is an obstacle for Beauvoir's project aimed at rescuing women from an 'inauthentic' self-definition. Phenomenological suggestions of a positive value of the body as such, and hence of the feminine body, are never fully spelled out because of the distorting Cartesian mirror into which Beauvoir still looks in the vain hope of discovering sometimes a disembodied (her)self as a (Cartesian) subject of an unachievable liberation.

3. *Marxismo e psicanalisi in 'Il secondo sesso'* di Simone de Beauvoir, in E. De Marchi (ed.), *In nome della donna*, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1976, pp. 510-526.

The paper discusses Beauvoir's interpretation of the Marxist and the Freudian contributions to our understanding of the feminine condition. A number of epistemological assumptions derived from Sartre's philosophy are pointed out. Beauvoir's reading of Marx, Engels, and Freud is discussed claiming that this reading is biased more by humanistic and historicist assumptions than by a really novel feminist point of view.

4. Concepts of Force in Spinoza's Psychology, *Studia Leibnitiana. Supplementa*, 20 (1981), pp. 138-144.

The paper discusses the role of the concepts of *conatus*, *potentia*, *vis* in Spinoza's project of a dynamicist approach to psychology understood as a new science of the Galilean kind.

5. Adam Smith, Newtonianism and Political Economy, *Manuscrito. Revista de Filosofia* 5\1 (1981), pp. 117-134.

The relationship between Adam Smith's methodological self-image and his own actual theoretical practice as a social scientist may be grasped only against the background of the Humean project of a Moral Newtonianism. The main features of Smith's idea of method are: (i) the provisional character of explanatory principles; (ii) 'internal' criteria of truth; (iii) the acknowledgement of an imaginative aspect in principles, with the related problem of the relationship between internal truth and external truth, in terms of mirroring of 'real' causes. Smith's Newtonian (as opposed to Cartesian) methodology makes room for progress in social theorizing in so far as it allows for a decentralization of the various fields of the Moral Science, contributing to the shaping of political economy. On the other hand, the Cartesian epistemological legacy in Smith's Newtonian methodology makes it impossible to account for the relationship between phenomena and theory, and suppresses the interpretative dimension of social science.

6. Adam Smith, l'economia politica e la filosofia morale, in L. Ruggiu (ed.), *Genesi dello spazio economico*, Napoli: Guida, 1982, pp. 147-184

The paper discusses the relationship of the economic doctrines with the ethical doctrines of Adam Smith in the light of the Lectures on Jurisprudence as a link between both set of doctrines. The thesis argued for is that of a comparatively autonomous status of economic discourse granted precisely by a constellation of ethical claims, on prudence, self-love, justice, and dignity of the individual.

7. Ordinamento del sapere, modelli metodologici ed economia politica in Adam Smith, in R. Faucci(ed.), *Gli italiani e Bentham. Dalla "felicità pubblica" all'economia del benessere. Atti del V Convegno degli storici del pensiero economico*, 2 voll., Milano: Angeli 1982, vol. I, pp. 153-163.

A discussion, based on Pownall's reading of *The Wealth of Nations*, of the Newtonian heritage in Adam Smith's project of a moral science encompassing political economy as one of its sub-disciplines.

8. *The Idealization of Economic Reality in Classical Political Economy*, in E. Agazzi, M. Mondadori, S. Tugnoli Pattaro (eds), *Logica e Filosofia della Scienza, oggi*, 2 vols., Bologna: CLUEB, 1986, vol. II, pp. 257-262.

The theory of 'objective value' is the central feature of the paradigm of 'political economy'. The Newtonian heritage plays a major role in giving political economy the status of a self-standing empirical science, and a reconstruction of this heritage casts fresh light on the idea of value and its role in the definition of the subject matter of political economy. Cognitive progress, as well as the theoretical uncertainties of classical political economy, turn out to be related with the dilemmas of Newtonian epistemology and the alternative between essentialist realism and instrumental conventionalism.

9. *Adam Smith e il concetto di ricchezza*, in F. Fagiani and G. Valera (ed.), *Categorie del reale e storiografia*, ed., Milano: Angeli 1986, pp. 289-299.

The novelty of Smith's way of looking at the economy lies in the social character of wealth, something new in comparison with its definition in physical terms by the Physiocrats. The possibility of carrying out such an idealization was a result of the adoption of a 'Newtonian', as opposed to a Cartesian epistemology, where an intermediate and provisional character of theoretical entities is explicitly accepted, dropping the strong epistemological realism of the Cartesians.

10. *Granger and Science as Network of Models*, *Manuscripto* 11/2 (1987), pp. 111-136.

The discovery of the role of models in science by Granger parallels the analogous discovery made by Mary Hesse and Marx Wartofsky. The role models are granted highlights the linguistic dimension of science, resulting in a 'softening' of Bachelard's rationalistic epistemology without lapsing into relativism. A 'linguistic' theory of metaphor, as contrasted with Bachelard's 'psychological' theory, is basic to Granger's account of models. A final paragraph discusses to what extent Granger's 'mature' theory of models would imply a revision of his early economic methodology.

11. *Metafore, modelli, linguaggio scientifico: il dibattito postempirista*, in, ed.. V. Melchiorre (ed.), *Simbolo e conoscenza* Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1988, pp. 31-102.

The paper examines the ways in which a discovery of the role metaphor in science took place in our century, starting with Stephen Pepper and Kenneth Burke and reaching Thomas Kuhn, Marx Wartofsky, and George Lakoff via Mary Hesse's view of analogy and metaphor. Hesse's view is criticized for sticking uncritically to Black's interaction view of metaphor, for keeping too much of a logical empiricist view of observation language, and for keeping too much of a Scholastic distinction between formal and material analogy.

12. *Remarks on Scientific Metaphors*, in M.L. Dalla Chiara, M.C. Galavotti eds, *Temi e prospettive della Logica e Filosofia della Scienza*, 2 vols., Bologna: CLUED, 1988, vol. II, pp. 114-116.

Recent contributions by Kuhn, Wartofsky, and Granger, converge in the direction of an extended view of models, one that acknowledges a metaphorical dimension in the language of science. Such a view is in some respects the opposite of the views of both Bachelard and the Logical Empiricists. A number of familiar puzzles of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of reference, the antinomy between realism and instrumentalism, that between explanation and understanding, and the status of scientific objectivity, may receive a new solution in the light of the Kuhn/Wartofsky/Granger view of scientific metaphors

13. *Adam Smith. Sceptical Newtonianism, Disenchanted Republicanism, and the Birth of Social Science*, in M. Dascal, O. Gruengard eds, *Knowledge and Politics: Case Studies on the Relationship between Epistemology and Political Philosophy*, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 83-110.

Both Smith's epistemology and his politics lead to a stalemate. The former is under the opposing pulls of an essentialist ideal of knowledge and of a pragmatist approach to the history of science. The latter still tries to provide a foundation for a natural law, while conceiving it as non-absolute and changeable. The consequences are (i) inability to complete both the political and the epistemological works projected by Smith; (ii) decentralization of the social order, giving rise to several partial orders, such as that of the market.

14. *L'illuminismo scozzese e il newtonianismo morale*, in M. Geuna, M.L. Pesante eds, *Interessi, passioni, convenzioni. Discussioni settecentesche su virtù e civiltà*, Milano: Angeli, 1992, pp. 41-76; Spanish abridged version: *La herencia newtoniana en la economía política del siglo XVIII*, in A. Elena, J. Ordóñez, M. Corbi eds, *Después de Newton: ciencia y sociedad durante la Primera Revolución Industrial*, Madrid: Anthropos, 1998, pp. 77-101.

The paper reconstructs the developments of a basic simple idea, namely the physico-moral analogy, in the works of the Scottish Enlighteners. The opposition of a 'Newtonian' to a 'Cartesian' approach yields the program of an 'experimental' moral science. This program, in its turn, will be never carried out as such, but (mainly as an unintended result) it will yield the shaping of political economy as an empirical science, distinguished to a point from moral philosophy and theology.

15. *Il commercio, le passioni, la virtù. Discussioni su etica ed economia fra Seicento e Settecento*, in M. Magatti (ed.), *La porta stretta. Etica ed economia negli anni '90*, Milano: Angeli, 1993, pp. 33-60.

The paper reconstructs the eighteenth-century discussion on commerce and virtue in the light of Hirschman's, Pocock's, Polanyi's, and Viner's interpretations of that discussion. The claims put forth are: the history of the emerging of modern market society has been heavily conditioned by a teleological and deterministic interpretation of history; the eighteenth-century discussion cannot be read neither in terms of ideologies nor in terms of the history of economic analysis; instead, a 'strategic' reading is fruitful in so far as it allows for two-ways interactions between discourse and social facts.

16. *Morali, economie, giochi linguistici*, *Ibidem*, pp. 131-150.

The recent popularity of the relationship of 'ethics' and 'economics' is at once revealing and misleading. It marks the withering away of a dogmatic confidence in a self-regulating and water-proof economic 'sphere'. It is also a muddled way of treating a number of interrelated but different issues: the interrelations between moralities (as historically given institutions) and markets (as partially self-regulating socially institutionalized mechanisms), the relationship between ethics and economic theory, and finally issues of distributive justice.

17. Charles Taylor e le due facce dell' individualismo, *Iride* 7 (1996), 16, pp. 514-520.

The paper is a reconstruction of Charles Taylor's diagnosis of western individualism. My claim is that the most novel trait in this diagnosis is the proposal of singling out the roots of the malaise of modernità in its inability of spelling out the moral intuitions expressed by the Rousseauvian ideal of "authenticity" and that this effort is hindered by mainstream Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy that avoids any explicit discussion of goods as well as by neo-Nietzscheans who mistake the "moral" ideal of authenticity with the "ethical" doctrine of relativism.

18. (with M. Dascal) Malthus and Ricardo on Economic Methodology, *History of Political Economy* 28/3 (1996), pp. 475-511.

The paper is a comparative study of the methodologies of Malthus and Ricardo. Its claims are: (i) economic laws almost always admit of exceptions for Malthus; for Ricardo even contingent predictions allow no exception apart from random temporary variations; (ii) both rely on the prestigious Newtonian paradigm, while interpreting it according to two distinct methodological traditions (the one deriving from MacLaurin, the other from Priestley); (iii) the choice of stressing what happens during intervals or in permanent states leads to opposing definitions of the main problem of economic science in so far as equilibrium is always already given for Ricardo and is never given for Malthus; (iv) their use of the ambiguous notion of "tendency" leaves unclear for both the degree of predictive power with which theories are endowed; (v) what both share is the idea of a natural order and this idea is the source of both shortcomings and endless disagreement.

19. (with M. Dascal) *Persuasion and Argument in the Malthus-Ricardo Correspondence*, in W.J. Samuels, J.E. Biddle (ed.), *Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology*, Stanford, Co: JAI Press, vol. 16 (1998), pp. 1-63.

In this paper we reconstruct the text, that is, we analyse the development of the discussion between Malthus and Ricardo both in the correspondence and in published works, paying special attention to (a) the use of methodological statements, (b) some pragmatic features of the controversy, (c) considerations pertaining to the meta-level of the controversy (assessments of the status of the controversy, of ways of solving it, etc.); then, we reconstruct the co-text, that is, unpublished papers by each opponent that were not made available to the other, records of exchanges between each of these and third parties, etc.; thirdly, we describe the essential features of the context, focusing on events that influenced the course of the controversy; (iv) we draw lessons from our case study on the role of co-text and context, on pragmatic and semantic interpretation, and on "casts of mind"

20. (with M. Dascal), Malthus and Ricardo: Two Styles for Economic Theory, *Science in Context* 11/2 (1998), pp. 229-254.

We examine the most famous controversy between economists as a means of shedding fresh light on the current debate about economic methodology. By focusing on the controversy as the primary unit of analysis, we show how methodological considerations are but one of a whole set of stratagems strategically employed by each opponent. We argue that each opponent's preference for a particular kind of stratagems expresses his own specific scientific style (within the general scientific and cultural style of an age). We also describe a dynamic dimension of the controversy, independent of the participants' intentions. Such a dimension is analysed in a "cycle" of the controversy, which begins with a well-defined issue and expands to additional topics, without reaching a "solution" to the initial issue. The definition and re-definition of the issue(s) at stake and of the difference between both participants is an essential and recurrent feature of such cycles; the conclusion of a cycle does not imply a real "closure" of the controversy, but only 'persuasion' – its ostensible aim. Rather, its "benefit" seems to lie in an unintended result -- clarification and deepening of contrasting approaches to the discipline -- due to its peculiar dynamics. In so far as the history of a discipline requires a reconstruction of such contrasts, it is indispensable for it to take into account the controversies where they emerge, and to view both the positive doctrines and the methodological posture of the contenders as parts of a wider framework, that is a scientific style.

21. Homo oeconomicus, in H.D. Kurz, N. Salvadori (ed.), *The Elgar Companion to Classical Economics*, Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998, pp. 377-381.

I claim that the classicist argues in terms of classes not individuals and their psychological assumptions tended to be realistic. As a consequence, the nineteenth-century anti-utilitarian and anti-economic reaction notwithstanding, the idea of homo oeconomicus is absent in Smith, Malthus and Ricardo.

22. Malthus, in, J.B. Davis, D.W. Hands, U. Mäki (ed.), *The Handbook of Economic Methodology*, Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998, pp. 273-276.

I reconstruct M.'s methodology on the basis of his own comments in published works and correspondence; the conclusion is that his methodology was not drastically alternative to Ricardo's, that it drew on a Scottish inspiration, and that it was far from historicism and romanticism, being instead based on one familiar reading of Newtonian methodology.

23. (with M. Dascal), The Malthus-Ricardo Correspondence: Sequential structure, argumentative patterns, and rationality, *Journal of Pragmatics* 31 (1999), pp. 1129-1172.

In the pre-sent paper we want to further substantiate the importance of the dialogical co-text of a controversy by a study of the Malthus-Ricardo controversy at two levels of analysis: (i) the sequential level of the moves and countermoves employed by each and (ii) the identification of recurrent patterns of argumentation employed by each. More specifically: first, we reconstruct, through an analysis of a chunk of the correspondence, a micro-level of specific moves and countermoves which constitute a sequential structure within which also meta-scientific and meta-controversial considerations may play a role; secondly, we move to the reconstruction of a macro-level of analysis, looking for patterns of argumentation, where the contenders combine various stratagems, some of which are represented by the moves and counter-moves identified in the preceding section; we devote here special attention to use of methodological arguments; finally we venture a few conclusions on the rationality of economic controversies. Our study makes use of notions from both pragmatics and rhetoric. We believe that both disciplines can be combined in a theory grounded on the role of inferential processes in communication (cf. Dascal and Gross, forthcoming). Rhetoric focuses primarily on such processes as operative in persuasive discourse, whereas pragmatics has traditionally been concerned with the paradigmatic case of exchanges of information. In controversies, both kinds of discourse are equally important. Hence the appropriateness of a combined pragmatic-rhetoric approach for the study of controversies.

24. *Les Lumières Écossaises et le roman philosophique de Descartes*, in Y. Senderowicz, Y. Wahl (ed.), *Descartes: Reception and Disenchantment*, Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 2000, pp. 65-88.

The paper reconstructs the reception of Descartes's work by the Scottish Enlighteners, from Colin MacLaurin to Dugald Stewart. The Scots' image of Descartes was a by-product of a scientific controversy; philosophical arguments were brought into the picture more as asides than as a primary focus of interest. As soon as the Cartesian physics withered away as a real alternative to Newtonian physics, only the philosophical arguments were left, with no memory of the context out of which they originated, and the focus of the discussion shifted from physics to the philosophy of mind and the theory of knowledge.

25. *Tendências neoaristotélicas na ética atual*, in M. Araújo de Oliveira, J.M. Arruda de Sousa (ed.), *Correntes Fundamentais da Ética Contemporânea*, Petrópolis (Brasil): Editora Vozes, 2000, pp. 9-30.

I describe both the German Aristotelian revival and the Anglo-Saxon virtue-ethics approach and argue that there are some reasons depending on changes in the long run in modern thought why the Grotian dismissal of Aristotelian practical rationality had finally to be overcome after a number of changes in the general philosophical climate, first among them the critique of Cartesian foundationalism.

26. *Legge di natura e scienza economica*, *Quaderni storici*, 35\3 (2000), pp. 697-730; shorter English version: Two views of Natural Law and the Shaping of Political Economy, *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* 2/5 (2002), pp. 65-80. I argue that differences between the 17th century 'new moral science' and Scholastic Natural Law Theory derived primarily from the sceptical challenge the former had to face. Pufendorf's project of a *scientia practica universalis* was the paramount expression of an anti-sceptical moral science, a 'science' both explanatory and normative, but also anti-dogmatic in so far as it tried to base its laws on those basic phenomena of human life that supposedly were outside the scope of sceptical doubt.

The main item of the Scholastic legacy to the new moral science, was a dichotomy between an 'intellectualist' and a 'voluntarist' view of natural law (or between *lex immanens* and *lex imposita*). Voluntarism lies at the root both of theological views such as those of Calvinism and of political views such as those of Hobbes and Locke. A need to counterbalance undesirable implications of extreme voluntarism may account for much of 17th and 18th centuries developments in ethics and politics.

Scottish natural jurisprudence, an expression of such a quest for a third way between scepticism and extreme voluntarism, is less secular and more empirical than received wisdom admits of. One of its side effects, namely a systematic, self-contained, and empirical economic theory, results from the search for a normative theory of social life on an empirical basis. The main tool for building such a theory, namely a view of societal laws as embedded in trans-individual mechanisms, derives from the voluntarist view of natural law as 'imposed' law.

Later discussions of social issues in terms of 'economic' and 'ethical' reasons originated partly from misreading of the Scottish natural jurisprudential framework for economic theory. Starting with the above reconstruction I try to shed some fresh light on recent discussions of the place of ethics within economics.

27. (with M. Dascal), The Unitarian Connection and Ricardo's Scientific Style, *History of Political Economy* 34/2 (2002), pp. 505-508.

We reply to Ph. Depoortere's paper "On Ricardo's method: The Unitarian influence examined. Some comments on Cremaschi and Dascal's article 'Malthus and Ricardo on Economic Methodology'". Depoortere asks two questions: (1) was Ricardo's 'conversion' to Unitarianism sincere? (2) did Ricardo follow the methodology of Priestley and Belsham? His answers are that he was a "religious sceptic" and he was not an 'empiricist' like Priestley and Belsham. We reply that the sincerity of Ricardo's religious beliefs is irrelevant since we start from the evidence that he was exposed for a long time to the intellectual influence of Belsham, primarily in matters of philosophy, and to deny this would imply a negative answer to a different question, namely, did Ricardo attend Unitarian meetings over 30 years? Then we reply that Ricardo inherited Belsham's version of Newtonian methodology, which omitted the fourth rule, that is the most anti-Cartesian and anti-systematic rule, and this has little to do with empiricism but instead with apriorism.

28. *Metaphors in the Wealth of Nations*, in S. Boehm, Ch. Gierke, H. Kurz, R. Sturm (ed.), *Is There Progress in Economics?*, Cheltenham: Elgar, 2002, pp. 89-114.

Abstract

This paper reconstructs the ways in which metaphors are used in the text of *The Wealth of Nations*. Its claims are: a) metaphor statements are basically similar to those in the *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*; b) the metaphors' 'primary subjects' refer to mechanics, hydraulics, blood circulation, agriculture, medicine; c) metaphors may be lumped together into a couple of families, the family of mechanical analogies, and that of iatro-political analogies. Further claims are: a basic physico-moral analogy is the framework for Smith's psychological theory as well as for his overall social theory and for his theory of market mechanisms; a iatro-mechanical analogy is as pervasive as the physico-moral analogy and provides the framework for his overall evolutionary theory of society; The invisible hand simile relies on the physico-moral analogy, and elaborates on the role of *vis attractiva* and *vis a tergo* in mechanics; A few implications of the above claims are: the presence of 'literary' devices in an economic text is no definitive proof of the goodness of any postmodernist approach to the reading of economics; the grain of truth in postmodernist readings is that rhetorical tropes are no mere means of persuasions, but instead do have cognitive content; the cognitive content of metaphors goes further than the context of discovery, as any liberalised version of logical empiricist philosophy of science would condone; metaphors did shape, or re-describe, or carve off the very field of phenomena to be explained by economic theory; a role for metaphorical re-descriptions is no argument against truth and theoretical progress in economics; instead, it was a blissful choice of metaphors that helped Adam Smith in widening the scope of economic explanation, in devising counter-intuitive connections among traditionally separated fields of phenomena, in shaping new hypotheses to be tested where nothing in the 'observed' phenomena would have suggested such hypotheses; in short, metaphor is just the key to theory change, and accordingly to 'progress' or 'growth of knowledge'.

29. *La rinascita dell'etica della virtù*, in F. Botturi, F. Totaro, C. Vigna (ed.), *La persona e i nomi dell'essere. Scritti in onore di Virgilio Melchiorre*, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2002, pp. 565-584;

I argue that the idea of virtue has become central in the last decades for moral philosophers and that this revival has highlighted the legitimacy and the importance of discussion of issues in normative ethics, something that philosophers both on the Continent and in the Anglo-Saxon world used to overlook in the first half of the twentieth-century. The paper ends with the conclusion that ethics is living interesting times, and it would be worth dedicating more energies to the discipline.

30. *On Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, in M.B. Wrigley (ed.), *Dialogue, Language, Rationality. A Festschrift for Marcelo Dascal*, special issue of *Manuscrito* 25/2 (2002), pp. 51-80.

I discuss the way in which the cleavage between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies originated, the (self-)images of both philosophical worlds, the converging rediscoveries from the Seventies, as well as recent ecumenist or anti-ecumenist strategies. I argue that pragmatism provides an important counter-instance to both the familiar self-images and to the fashionable ecumenist or anti-ecumenist strategies. My conclusions are: (i) Continental philosophy does not exist; (ii) less obviously, also analytic philosophy does *not* exist, or does *no more* exist as a current or a paradigm; what does exist is, on the one hand, philosophy of language and, on the other, philosophy of mind, that is, two disciplines; (iii) the dissolution of analytic philosophy as a school has been extremely fruitful, precisely in so far as it has left room for disciplines and research programmes; (iv) what is left, of the Anglo-American/Continental cleavage is primarily differences in *styles*, depending partly on intellectual traditions, partly owing to sociology, history, institutional frameworks; *these* differences should not be blurred by rash ecumenism; besides, theoretical differences are alive as ever, but within both camps; finally, there is indeed a *lag* (not a difference) in the appropriation of intellectual techniques by most schools of 'Continental' philosophy, and this should be overcome through appropriation of what the best 'analytic' philosophers have produced.

B31. *Kant's empirical moral philosophy*, in B. Bercic, N. Smokrovic (ed.), *Proceedings of Rijeka Conference "Knowledge, Existence and Action"*, Hrvatsko društvo za analitičku filozofiju – Filozofski fakultet Rijeka, Rijeka 2003, pp. 21-24.

I argue that Kant took from Moses Mendelssohn, without paying due acknowledgment, one of his basic ideas, namely a distinction between geometry of morals and a practical ethic. He paid a somewhat heavy price for that, since, by a kind

of nemesis, he was drastically misunderstood by his followers precisely on this point; he had learned the lesson of the sceptics and Jansenists, that men are prompted to act by deceptive ends, and he was aware that human actions are also empirical phenomena, where laws like the laws of Nature may be detected. His practical ethics made room for judgment as a holistic procedure for assessing the saliency of relevant moral qualities of one situation; this procedure yields the same results as the geometry of morals does for abstract cases, but does so immediately and without balancing conflicting duties with each other, since what makes for the salient quality of a situation is perceived from the very beginning. Kantian ethics on principle has an answer to the classical objections raised by consequentialists against so-called deontological ethics.

B32. Ricardo and the Utilitarians, *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 11/3 (2004), pp. 377-404.

The paper discusses Ricardo's relationship to Mill and Bentham. It discusses first the origins of the myth of Ricardo's dependence from Bentham through Mill, and Halévy's contribution to the freezing of such a myth. The paper reconstructs what were their shared political commitments and activities and the kind of specific political views and agenda that may be ascribed to Ricardo himself.

The paper discusses then the question of Ricardo's adhesion to Benthamite ethics. It examines fragments in Ricardo's correspondence with Maria Edgeworth and Francis Place, and adds fresh light on the issue by highlighting the partial overlapping between Bentham's ethics and the kind of intuitionism with theological consequentialism that Ricardo had learned from the Unitarian minister Thomas Belsham.

33. On the Very idea of a Left, *Synthesis Philosophica*, 19/2 (2004), pp. 475-485;

versione croata: O pravoj ideji Ljevice, in P. Barišić (ed.), *Demokracija i Eticka*, Zagreb 2005, pp. 47-56.

Starting with one of the last writings by Norberto Bobbio I discuss the origins of the idea of a political "Left". I trace them back to historical circumstances of the French Revolution and, behind them, to ways of symbolical representation to be located within the wider framework of forms of symbolic spatial organization of the social space.

It turns out that "Left" is, more than a concept, a symbol or a metaphor. That Left is connected in its very roots with the idea of equality. That the very idea of democracy is connected in a similar way to both ideas of Equality and Left.

A further implication is that the universally shared normative ideal of democracy and the (to a point) universally shared normative ideal of equality are carried as a matter of course by the very framework of democracy as a set of institutions. Thus it is virtually impossible to defend a consistent rhetoric of a political Right within the framework of a democratic society.

The final discussion is whether the concept-metaphor "Left" is still useful, whether it highlights relevant features of society more than obscuring them, and the answer is, not unlike Bobbio's – is that it is will still be useful, at least for a relevant number of purposes, until human societies will be marked by strong inequalities.

34. L'etica analitica dalla legge di Hume al principio di Kant, in A. Campodonico ed., *Legge e virtù. La ripresa dell'etica normativa nella filosofia anglosassone*, Genova: Il Melangolo 2005, pp. 9-46.

I reconstruct a plot in the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon ethical discussion. I discuss the reasons why in the first half of the twentieth century the claim of a neutral character of metaethics vis-à-vis normative ethics was generally accepted. Then I discuss the reasons for a U-turn that took place in 1958, which brought back to the forefront two traditional schools of normative ethics, Kantian and Utilitarian, and the reasons for criticism from the new school of virtue ethics. I end by claiming that intuitionism and Kantian ethics will still be on the agenda for some time.

35. Adam Smith antiutilitarista, *La società degli individui*, 8/3 (2005), pp. 17-32.

I argue that Adam Smith, far from being a utilitarian, as claimed by Alain Caillé, was instead a semi-sceptical philosopher who defended a pluralistic (and thus anti-utilitarian *avant la lettre*) normative ethics of prudence, justice, benevolence, and, far from being the founder of the science of a system self-produced by the interaction of individual self-interests, was a sharp critic of the practices of the commercial society of his time in the name of liberty, justice, and equality. In a word, was from being the putative father of Capitalism, Adam Smith was the father of a liberal left and a forefather of the present-day critics of globalisation.

36. L'etica delle virtù kantiana: commenti a Berti, *Etica e Politica/Ethics & Politics*, 2005/2, pp. 1-13.

I argue that Kant's normative ethics was in fact a kind of virtue ethics and most of the opposition between Aristotelianism and Kantian ethics in the last three decades has been mostly cross-purpose.

37. Alcuni motivi della ripresa dell'etica economica nella seconda metà del Novecento, *Bollettino della Società Filosofica Italiana*, nuova serie n. 186 (settembre-dicembre 2005), pp. 5-19.

I reconstruct a few themes of the early twentieth-century discussion that headed to the claim of a value-free character of economic theory and of the subsequent discussion that headed to a resumption of a rich discussion of economic ethics and of applied ethics with regard to economic practices. I examine the discussion on value-freedom from classical

political economy to Robbins, the role played by utilitarianism in economic theory and the puzzles connected to the idea of utility and several recent discussions on social choice, welfare, and collective choice. I end by discussing a few good reasons for the revival of business ethics.

38. Sidgwick e il progetto di un'etica scientifica, *Etica e Politica/Ethics & Politics*, 7/1 (2006), pp. 1-36.

Sidgwick e il progetto di un'etica scientifica: risposte a Greco e Pellegrino, *Etica e Politica/Ethics & Politics*, 7/1 (2006), pp. 1-3.

In this paper I discuss the role played by the ideas of 'common sense' and 'common sense morality' in Sidgwick's system of ideas. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consistent code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the example provided by the natural sciences, in order to reach also in the moral field some body of 'mature' knowledge similar to that provided by the natural sciences. His whole polemic with intuitionist was vitiated by the a priori assumption that the widespread ethos, not the theories of intuitionist philosophers was what was really worth considering

In spite of the naïve positivist starting point Sidgwick was encouraged by his own approach in exploring the fruitfulness of coherentist methods for normative ethics. Thus Sidgwick left an ambivalent legacy to twentieth-century ethics: the dogmatic idea of a 'new' morality of a consequentialist kind, and the fruitful idea that in normative ethics we can argue rationally even if without shared foundations.

39. The Mill-Whewell controversy on ethics and its bequest to analytic philosophy, in E. Baccarini- S. Prijic Samarzja eds., *Rationality in Belief and Action*, University of Rijeka, Rijeka: Faculty of Arts and Sciences - Croatian Society for Analytic Philosophy, 2006, pp. 45-62.

In this paper I intend to reconstruct the weight of rational and non rational factors in ethical controversies and to highlight the mixed bequest this controversy left to 20th century analytic ethics.

I argue that the structure of the controversy includes 'Kuhnian' factors, rhetoric and pragmatic dimensions, and that a consistent self-criticism of his own previous views may be detected in Mill's writings published after the controversy.

I argue that the controversy's bequest for analytic ethics includes: (i) anti-empiricist elements, which are what Sidgwick has taken from Whewell without paying due acknowledgement; (ii) consequentialist elements (impossibility of establishing what is duty in the real case, impossibility of solving moral dilemmas), which are what Sidgwick has taken over from Mill, on the latter's authority and without due scrutiny of Whewell's counter-arguments.

40. Kant On Civilization, Moralization, and The Paradox of Happiness, in P.L. Porta - L. Bruni eds., *The Handbook of Happiness and Economics*, Aldershot: Elgar 2007, pp. 110-123.

There is a well-known page in sect. I of Kant's *Grundlegung* where he talks of "misology" and accounts for the origins of such an odd doctrine on the basis of the fact that reason is an unsatisfactory tool for obtaining happiness, and instinct would have been a better tool for that purpose. This isolated remark has been given less weight than it deserves. This happened for a number of reasons: a) comparative neglect of Kant's publication from the 1790s, such as the *Anthropologie* and the essays on philosophy of history, due to overemphasis on the moral writings from the eighties, which apparently confirmed the received image of Kant's practical philosophy as a formalist and rigorist ethics; b) unavailability until recently of the lectures on anthropology; c) opposition of Kant's and Smith's doctrines by the nineteenth-century German literature. When read together with the unpublished Lectures on geography, those on anthropology, and the published essays on the philosophy of history, the mentioned page from the *Grundlegung* results to be a part in a comparatively articulated body of Kantian economic doctrines. This body includes several claims, which were both commonplace in the eighteenth century and interesting enough in the context of Kant's system of ideas, namely: a) the claim of a 'refining' function of commerce; b) the claim that a 'pragmatic' teleology, that is, a quest for happiness, is built in human action; c) the claim that well-being, if not happiness, is a morally positive end – even if indirectly, that is, as a precondition for the individual's independence, and accordingly for virtue; d) the claim that the quest for happiness is deceptive, in so far as the growth of 'reason' – i.e. the arts and the sciences – is a poor means to happiness; e) nonetheless, the growth of reason has carried civilisation; f) civilisation is a precondition to 'moralisation', and this is an end objectively built in the teleology of reason (qua practical reason); e) this deeper "practical" teleology of morality may be thought of as a deeper agenda hidden below the overt "pragmatic" teleology of happiness.

The results of the above reconstruction are: a) Kant's practical philosophy is richer than the received image, making room for an "empirical moral philosophy" or moral anthropology making room for treatment of commerce, needs, value and price, happiness and well-being; b) the overall social theory and philosophy of history is less different from Adam Smith's than the received image makes believe; c) the paradox of happiness is central to Kant's philosophy; d) a distinction between happiness and well-being is clearly drawn; e) the distinction plays a basic role in establishing a link between the economic and the moral life.

41. Il relativismo etico fra antropologia culturale e filosofia analitica, in I. Tolomio ed., *Rileggere l'etica tra contingenza e principi*, Padova: CLUEP 2007, pp. 15-45.

I reconstruct the discussion on ethical relativism and cultural relativism through three different phases: German philosophy in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the reaction to nineteenth-century ethnocentrism by Boas and Malinowski, the resumption of some anthropological conclusions in a rather disappointing discussion in analytic ethics

of the Seventies/Eighties.

I argue that the alternative between absolutism and relativism may be rather easily dissolved by taking the open-textured character of any general principle into account and that a kind of universalism without absolutism is the reasonable enough last word on the discussion of ethical relativism.

42. Newtonian Physics, Experimental Moral Philosophy, and the Shaping of Political Economy, in R. Arena, Sh. Dow, M. Klaes eds., *Open economics*, Oxford: Routledge, 2008.

In this paper I reconstruct the birth, blossoming and decline of an eighteenth century program, namely “Moral Newtonianism”. I reconstruct the interaction, or co-existence, of different levels: positive theories, methodology, worldviews and trace the presence of scattered items of the various levels in the work of Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart.

I highlight how Mirowski’s reconstruction of the interaction between physics and economics may be extended to the eighteenth century in an interesting way once the outdated reconstruction of Adam Smith that has been adopted by Mirowski is updated.

I show how general methodological ideas, such as the distinction between ultimate causes or essences and intermediate principles, that originated in a context where the issue was the interaction between natural science and theology, proved useful when transferred to social theory in encouraging a kind of “experimental” approach to social phenomena.

I discuss finally the genesis of frozen metaphors such as equilibrium, circulation, and value, arguing that Canguilhem’s lesson – namely that scientific change is produced not only by similarity but also by opposition – may be applied also to the history of economic thought. I take as an example Adam Smith’s ‘discovery’ of social mechanisms vis-à-vis his sceptical mistrust of neo-Stoic and Platonic views of a world-order.